In the context of pre-Bayesian games we analyze resource selection games with unknown number of players. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in a game with strictly increasing linear cost functions every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. In order to perform the analysis we define safety-level equilibrium for pre-Bayesian games, and prove that it exists in a compact-continuous-concave setup; in particular it exists in a finite setup.
INTRODUCTION
In a resource selection system, Γ, there is a set of m resources, j ∈ {1, · · · , m}. Each resource j is associated with a cost function wj : {1, 2, · · · , · · · } → , where wj(k) is the cost for every user of resource j if there are k users. Together with a set of n players a resource selection system defines a game in strategic form-a resource selection game, Γ(n). The action set 1 of every player i in Γ(n) is the set of 1 When dealing with games in strategic form the choice set of a player is referred to as an action set or as a strategy set. We use "actions" rather than "strategies" because we keep
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. resources M , and the cost of i depends, via the resource-cost functions, on the resource she chooses and on the number of other players who choose this resource. Thus, resource selection games are special types of congestion games [23, 18] . A resource selection game is also referred to as a simple congestion game. 2 In many situations the assumption that every player knows the number of players is not reasonable. The goal of the current paper is to analyze resource selection games with unknown number of players. One approach for analyzing such situations is the Bayesian approach, where it is assumed that the distribution of the random set of players is commonly known. In this approach one is interested in Bayesian equilibrium. 3 The goal of this paper is to analyze resource selection games in the non-Bayesian setup in which the players do not have probabilistic information about the number of the other players in the game. We will use what we call pre-Bayesian games. A pre-Bayesian game is defined to be a Bayesian game without the state probability. 4 In a classical pre-Bayesian game there is a fixed set of players I = {1, 2, · · · , n}, each of them is endowed with a set of actions, x i ∈ X i . There is a set of states ω ∈ Ω. The payoff of player i, u i (ω, x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) depends on the realized state, on her choice of action, xi, and on the choices of all other players. However, the realized state is not known to the players. Every player receives a state-correlated signal, t i =t i (ω) on which she conditions her action. A preBayesian game becomes a Bayesian game when a commonly known probability measure on the set of states is added to the system. The above description is not general enough for our purpose because the set of players is fixed. We generalize the model by allowing the set of active players as well as the action sets to depend on the state.
AAMAS'06
In pre-Bayesian games one can deal with ex-post equilibrium, which generalize the notion of dominant strategy the notion of strategy to describe the choice set of a player in "bigger" games. 2 Simple congestion games and their generalization to playerspecific games were discussed in [22, 16, 8, 27, 11] . Simple congestion games were also discussed in the price of anarchy literature, e.g., [12, 2] 3 See [15, 14, 6] for such analysis in the context of auctions, and [19, 20, 21] for such analysis in the context of elections. 4 Surprisingly, until recently such games did not have a name in the literature. Pre-Bayesian games have been also called games in informational form and games without probabilistic information [9, 7] , games with incomplete information with strict type uncertainty [10] , and distribution-free games with incomplete information [1] . equilibrium. Such equilibria rarely exist, and consequently only very special type of pre-Bayesian games have been discussed in Game Theory or in Computer Science. Hyafil and Boutilier (2004) [10] suggested minimax regret equilibrium as a solution to general pre-Bayesian games. In such equilibrium, every agent, after receiving her informational signal is using the minimax regret criterion in the decision making problem obtained by fixing the behavior of all other agents. They proved that such an equilibrium exists in every finite pre-Bayesian game. In this paper we define another type of equilibrium concept, safety level equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, every player, after receiving her informational signal use the maximin payoff (or minimax cost) criteria in the decision making problem obtained by fixing the behavior of all other agents. We use a more general definition of pre-Bayesian games and prove that a safety level equilibrium always exists. Independently, [1] also define safety level equilibrium. However, they restricted attention to a very particular information structure in which all players receive the same signal. All of the above mentioned existence results rely on Kakutani fixed point theorem, which is a standard tool in game theory for proving equilibria existence results.
5
As we said, our main goal in this paper is to analyze resource selection games with unknown players, and we do it by analyzing safety-level equilibria in such games. However, for the sack of completeness we also define and prove existence of a third type of equilibrium, which is consistent with a large part of single agent setups of incomplete information in CS. We define competitive ratio equilibrium and prove that it exists.
6
Once we have the right tool we proceed to analyze resource selection games with unknown number of players. We focus on a model with increasing resource cost functions. In order to derive results for the case in which the number of players is unknown we prove several results, some of them are interesting for themselves, about classical resource selection games with known number of players. In particular we prove that every resource selection game possesses a unique mixedaction symmetric equilibrium. When the number of players is k, the unique symmetric equilibrium mixed-action of every player is denoted by
, where p k j is the probability that a player chooses resource j. In our pre-Bayesian model all active players know a common bound, n, on the number of active players, but the players do not know the true number of players, say k, k ≤ n. Hence, the only signal a player receives is an "activity" signal. A state in this pre-Bayesian game is the set of active players. We prove that a resource selection game with unknown number of players has a unique symmetric safety level equilibrium. In this equilibrium, every active player is using the unique symmetric-equilibrium mixed-action, p n in the game in which the number of players is commonly known 5 We note that an equilibrium concept for specific types of pre-Bayesian games were already defined in [26, 25, 24] in the context of work on artificial social systems, and in [13] , where another equilibrium concept is defined for particular pre-Bayesian auctions. Both groups of authors used versions of safety-level equilibrium. 6 The competitive ratio approach is relatively common in computer science in the context of single agent decision problems (see e.g., [3] . A recent paper of [5] applies the notion of competitive equilibrium to a particular problem of online algorithms. and equals n.
Hence, when the number of players is k, every player uses p k when the number of players is commonly known, and every player is using p n when the number of players is unknown. Surprisingly, the lack of knowledge makes each of the players better off in the linear system, in which the resource cost functions are linear! That is, we show that in the linear model, when there are k players, and each of them is using p n , the cost of each player is at most the cost he obtains in the unique symmetric equilibrium, p k . Under very modest assumptions every player is strictly better off.
The above results are applicable to a mechanism design setup in which the organizer knows the number of active players, and the players do not know this number. If the goal of the organizer is to maximize revenue then he is better off revealing his private information.
7 If his goal is to maximize social surplus then he should not reveal the information. In order to estimate the gain of the players resulting from their ignorance we investigate in the last section the function c
is the cost for a player in a k-player setup when all players play the mixedaction associated with the symmetric equilibrium of the corresponding n-player setup.
BACKGROUND
We remark that games can be analyzed with either payoff functions or cost functions. Most of the general theory has been developed with payoff functions. However, congestion games have been mainly analyzed using cost functions. Translating results proved in one of the setups to the other setup is obvious in most cases. 8 We follow the tradition of previous literature in the sense that the general theory is discussed with payoff functions, while resource selection games are discussed with cost functions.
A game in strategic form is a tuple, Γ = (I, (X i ) i∈I , (ui)i∈I ). I is a nonempty set of players, Xi is a nonempty set of actions for player i, and u i : X → is the payoff function of i, where X = × i∈I X i is the set of action profiles. Hence u i (x) is the payoff of player i when the profile of actions x ∈ X is played. Γ is a finite game if I and X are finite sets.
Let x ∈ X denote a profile of actions. For each i ∈ I we let x −i = (x j ) j∈I\{i} denote the actions played by everyone but i.
A permutation of the set of players is a one-to-one function from I onto I. For every permutation π and for every action profile x ∈ X we denote by πx the permutation of x by π. That is, (πx) i = x π(i) for every player i. Γ is a symmetric game if Xi = Xs for all i, s ∈ I, and
for every player i, for every action profile x, and for every permutation π. A symmetric action profile is an action profile x such that x i = x s for every i, s ∈ I. x is a symmetric equilibrium if it is both an equilibrium profile and a symmetric action profile .
For any finite set C, ∆(C) denotes the set of probability distributions over C. Let Γ = (I, (X i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I ) be a fi-nite game in strategic form. Every p i ∈ ∆(X i ) is called a mixed action for i. p i (x i ) is the probability that player i plays action xi. Every vector p ∈ ∆ = ×i∈I ∆(Xi) defines a probability distribution over X; The probability,
is called the mixed extension of Γ. A mixed action for player i in the game Γ is an action for player i in the game Γ m . A mixed action equilibrium in a finite game Γ is defined to be an equilibrium in Γ m . It is well-known (see e.g, [4] ) that every finite symmetric game in strategic form possesses a symmetric mixed action equilibrium.
RESOURCE SELECTION GAMES WITH KNOWN NUMBER OF PLAYERS
In a resource selection system, Γ = (M, (wj)
is the cost for every user of resource j if there are k users. Together with the set of players In = {1, · · · , n} a resource selection system defines a game in strategic form-a resource selection game Γ(I). In this paper only the number of players will be relevant (and not the "names" of the players) and therefore we will denote a resource selection game by Γ(n). The action set of every player i in Γ(n) is the set of resources M , and the cost of i depends on the resource she chooses and on the number of other players that choose this resource via the resource-cost functions. That is,
, where for every resource j and for every action profile
is the number of all players s for which x s = j. Obviously every resource selection game is a finite symmetric game.
Let p ∈ ∆(M ) be a mixed action of an arbitrary player. That is, p = (p1, · · · , pm), where pj is the probability that a player who uses the mixed action p will select resource j. We denote the support of p by supp(p). That is supp(p) = {j ∈ M |p j > 0}. Denote by c n (p, j) the expected cost of a player that chooses resource j when each of the other n − 1 players in Γ(n) is using p. Let c n (p) be the expected cost of every player when each of the n players in Γ(n) is choosing p.
For every n ≥ 1, and for every 0
where E stands for the expectation operator. That is,
Let (q, · · · , q) ∈ ∆(M ) n be a symmetric mixed-action equilibrium profile in Γ(n). We will refer to q as a symmetricequilibrium action. Theorem 1. Every resource selection game with at least two players (n ≥ 2) with increasing 9 resource cost functions 9 That is, w j (k) < w j (k + 1) for all j and k.
possesses a unique symmetric mixed-action equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 1 we need some preparations. The proof of the following lemma is given in the full version.
Lemma 2. Let Γ(n), n ≥ 2 be a resource selection game. Let q, p ∈ ∆(M ) be mixed actions, and let j ∈ M be a resource such that w j is increasing in {1, 2,
Proof. We have to show that c n (p, j) is increasing in pj. By manipulating (2)
where the last equality follows from the fact that
is strictly decreasing in p j for every k = 0, ..., n − 2.In addition, w j is strictly increasing, and therefore c n (p, j) is strictly increasing in pj.
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose in negation that there is more than one mixedaction symmetric equilibrium in Γ(n). Let q and p be two symmetric equilibrium actions with p = q. Since p = q there exists j ∈ M with qj = pj. W.l.o.g qj > pj. Therefore there exist a resource r ∈ M such that r = j and q r < p r . We get a contradiction from the following sequence of inequalities:
, where the strict inequalities hold hold by Lemma 2 and the other inequalities hold because q and p are equilibrium actions. 2
For every n ≥ 1 we will denote the unique symmetric equilibrium in Γ(n) by p n , and we denote by c n = c n (p n ) the equilibrium cost of a player in Γ(n).
We say that a resource cost function wj is convex if it can be extended to a convex function on [1, ∞) .
The following lemma will be useful later. 
Proof. Recall that p
n is the unique symmetric-equilibrium action in Γ(n), and that c n = c n (p n ) is the symmetricequilibrium cost of every player. As p n is in equilibrium, c n (p n , j) = c n for every j ∈ supp(p n ) . For every resource j we denote by wj the convex extension of wj to [0, ∞). As wj is convex, 1) ), where the first equality follows from (1), the inequality follows from the convexity of w j , and the last equality follows from the well-known fact that
Obviously, there exists j ∈ supp(p) for which p
Since wj is increasing and convex, limn→∞ wj(n) = ∞ for every resource j. Therefore lim n→∞ c n = ∞. Hence, there exists N such that for every n ≥ N c n > max (1), a player will decreases her cost by deviating from p n to r (assuming every other player is using p n ). This contradicts p n being a symmetric-equilibrium action.
EQUILIBRIUM IN PRE-BAYESIAN GA-MES
In this section we define a general model of pre-Bayesian games, and present and prove existence results for safetylevel, and competitive-ratio equilibria in such games. We also give the definition of minimax-regret equilibrium (existence proved by Hyafil and Boutilier [10] ).
A pre-Bayesian game is a tuple H = (Ω, I,
• Ω is a set of states.
• I is a finite set whose elements are called potential players.
• J : Ω → 2 I \ {∅} is the function determining the set of active players. That is, i is active at ω if i ∈ J(w).
Let Ωi be the subset of states at which i is active. That is, Ωi = {ω ∈ Ω|i ∈ J(w)}.
• Z i is the set of potential actions of i.
Only a subset of Z i will be available to i at a given state.
• For every potential player i, Xi : Ωi → 2 Z i \ {∅} is the variable determining the set of actions that are available for i at ω.
Let X(ω) = × i∈J(ω) Xi(w) be the set of action profiles that can be generated at ω.
• For every potential player i, and for every ω ∈ Ω i , ui(ω, * ) : X(ω) → is the payoff function of i at the state ω.
• T i is the set of possible signals that i may receive.
We will sometimes follow the traditional approach in economics and refer to t i ∈ T i as a type of i.
•t i : Ω i → T i is the signaling function of i.
That is, whenever i is active at ω she receives the signal t i (ω).
Without loss of generality we assume that every type is possible. That is,ti(Ωi) = Ti.
Let Ω i (t i ) be the set of all states ω that generate the
•
That is, players know their set of actions; In other words, Xi is a constant function over Ωi(ti) for every
This assumption allows us to define the set of available actions for i when his type is t i . Indeed we define
The pre-Bayesian game proceeds as follows. Nature chooses ω ∈ Ω, and the game in strategic form Γ(ω) = (J(w), (Xi(ω)) i∈J(ω) , (ui(ω, * )) i∈J(ω ) is played. Every active player in the game, i ∈ J(ω) receives the signalt i (ω), which reveals part of the information about the game. The minimal information is the set of available actions at ω. Thus, every i ∈ J(ω) chooses xi ∈ Xi(ω) and his payoff is ui (ω, x) , where x = (xi) i∈J (ω) .
A strategy for a potential player i in the pre-Bayesian game H is a function s i :
Hence, i follows the strategy s i if whenever he is active and receives the signal ti he chooses the action si(ti). The set of strategies of i is denoted by Σi = Σi(H), and the set of strategy profiles is denoted by Σ = Σ(H), that is Σ = × i∈I Σ i .
Let H be a pre-Bayesian game. We say that H is finite if the set of states, and the sets of potential actions are finite.
We say that H is a compact-continuous pre-Bayesian game if the set of states are finite, Z i is a compact subset of some Euclidean space 10 , X i (t i ) is a compact subset of Z i for every type ti, and ui(ω, * ) is continuous on X(ω) for every ω ∈ Ωi.
A compact continuous pre-Bayesian game is (quasi) concave if Z i is a convex set, X i (t i ) is a convex subset of Z i for every type t i , and u i (ω, * , x −i ) is (quasi) concave on X i (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω i and every
Let H = (Ω, I, (Zi)i∈I , J, (Xi)i∈I , (ui(ω, * )ω∈Ω,i∈I , (Ti)i∈I ) be a finite pre-Bayesian game. We are about to define the mixed extension, H m of H by allowing every active player at ω ∈ Ω to choose a mixed action µ i ∈ ∆(X i (ω)). However we need the following definition.
For every ω ∈ Ωi let ∆i(ω) be the set of all probability distributions µi ∈ ∆(Zi) that vanishes outside Xi(ω). Obviously, ∆ i (ω) can be identified with ∆(X i (ω)).
The pre-Bayesian game 
Safety-level Equilibrium
Let H be a compact-continuous pre-Bayesian game. For every profile, s ∈ Σ of strategies in H, and for every state ω we denote by s[ω] the profile of actions chosen in X(w) when
Let i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, xi ∈ Xi(ti), and let s−i = (sj) j∈I\i be a profile of strategies of all players but i. The worst case cost of i is
Wi(ti, s−i, xi) = min
ω∈Ω i (t i )
ui(ω, xi, s−i[ω]).
Obviously Wi(ti, s−i, * ) is continuous on Xi(ti). We say that
A strategy of player i, s i , is a safety-level best-response to s −i if for every type t i , s i (t i ) is optimal for t i given s −i . A strategy profile s = (si)i∈I is called a safety-level equilibrium if for every i, si is a safety-level best-response to s−i.
Hence, s is a safety-level equilibrium if and only if for every ω, and for every player i, which is active at ω, s i (t i (ω)) is optimal fort i (ω) given s −i .
A safety-level equilibrium in a pre-Bayesian game with exactly one state is simply a Nash equilibrium in this game. We next show that safety-level equilibria exist in every quasi concave game.
Theorem 2. Every quasi concave pre-Bayesian game possesses a safety-level equilibrium.
Proof. Note that for every i Σ i is a closed convex and compact subset of Z T i i . Therefore Σ is a closed convex and compact set because it is a cartesian products of such sets. For every s ∈ Σ and for every i ∈ I let Bi(s) ⊆ Σi be the set of all d i ∈ Σ i , which are best response to 
Minimax-regret Equilibrium
Minimax-regret equilibrium was defined by Hyafil and Boutilier in [10] . We use their definition for our general model of pre-Bayesian games.
Let H be a compact-continuous pre-Bayesian game. Let i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti and let s−i = (sj) j∈I\i be a profile of strategies of all players but i. Let ω ∈ Ω i (t i ). The regret of x i ∈ X i (t i ) at w is defined as:
We say that yi ∈ Xi(ti) is a minimax regret strategy at 
Competitive Ratio Equilibrium
Competitive ratio equilibrium resembles the minimax-regret equilibrium. They differ only in the definition of regret.
Let H be a compact-continuous pre-Bayesian game, where all payoff functions are positive. Let s−i = (sj) j∈I\i be a profile of strategies of all players but i, let t i be an active type of i, and let ω ∈ Ω(t i ). Replace the definition of R(x i , w, t i , s −i ) in the previous section with the following:
Note thatR is well defined since all payoff functions are positive. A strategy profile s is a competitive-ratio equilibrium if for every player i s i is a minimax-regret best response to s−i with respect to the regret functionR. The proof follows from Theorem 3 by applying the logarithmic function to the payoff functions.
RESOURCE SELECTION GAMES WITH UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PLAYERS
Consider a fixed resource selection system, Γ with the set of resources M = {1, · · · , m}, m ≥ 1, and resource cost functions (wj) m j=1 . We proceed to describe our model of resource selection games with unknown number of players. Let I = {1, 2, · · · , n}, n ≥ 1. be the set of potential players. The set of states, Ω is the set 2 I \{∅} of all nonempty subsets of I. The set of active players at state K is K itself. That is J(K) = K for every K ∈ Ω. The set of actions of player i is the set of resources. That is, Z i = M for every player i. The set of types of i ∈ I is a singleton, T i = {active}. That is, an active player knows that he is active. The non-active players do not receive any signal. For every player i ∈ I and every ω ∈ Ωi X i (ω) = M . For every i ∈ I and for every K ∈ Ω such
is the number of all players l ∈ K for which z l = zi. The above pre-Bayesian game is finite. We denote its mixed extension by H Γ (n), and we referred to H Γ (n) as a resource selection game with unknown number of players. A strategy of player i in H Γ (n) can be described by a mixed action q[i] ∈ ∆(M ). That is, when receiving the signal {active}, i uses q [i] . Since we deal with costs and not with payoffs we use minimax rather than maximin in the definition of safety-level equilibrium. Proof. Assume µ is a mixed-action equilibrium in Γ(n). Let i be an active player. By the comment we made before the statement of the lemma,
Because µ is a mixed-action equilibrium in Γ(n), the min in the right hand-side of the above formula is attained at q [i] . Therefore µ is a safety-level equilibrium in H Γ (n). An analogous argument proves the if part of the lemma.
Theorem 5. Let Γ be a resource selection system in which the resource cost functions are non-decreasing. HΓ(n) has a unique symmetric safety-level equilibrium. In this symmetric safety-level equilibrium every player is using the strategy p n , where p n is the unique symmetric-equilibrium action in Γ(n).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
By Theorem 5, each of the players in H Γ (n) is using the strategy p n , where p n is the unique symmetric-equilibrium mixed action in Γ(n). However, the cost of each active player in H Γ (n) is not c n = c n (p n ), it depends on the true state. If the true state is K, that is K is the set of active players, and |K| = k, the cost of each active player i is c k (p n ). It is worthy to compare this cost with the cost c k = c k (p k ) that every player in K would have paid had the players in K known the state. We make these comparison in linear models. We say that a resource selection system is linear if for every resource j there exists a constant d j such that wj(k) = wj(1)+(k − 1)dj for every k ≥ 1. For every number of players, n, the associated resource selection game, Γ(n), as well as the associated resource selection game with unknown player set, H Γ (n) will be called linear too. Note that in a linear system, w j is increasing if and only if d j > 0, and w j is non-decreasing if and only if dj ≥ 0. , where A = 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper tackles two fundamental issues in the study of multi-agent systems:
1. Providing solution concepts for multi-agent interactions with incomplete information, where exact probabilistic information is unavailable.
2. Incorporating uncertainty about the number of participants into the context of resource selection systems, one of the most fundamental settings in multi-agent systems.
Our results turned out to be both general and illuminating. On one hand, we provided general existence results for safety-level/competitive ratio equilibria. On the other hand, we were able to apply them to the context of resource selection games. Most importantly, our study led to highly surprising results, showing the positive effect of ignorance about the number of participants on the agents' costs and the system surplus.
Together, our work provides a foundational rigorous study of congestion games with incomplete information, while presenting general tools for the analysis of multi-agent systems where exact probabilistic information is not available.
